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ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL AGGRESSION: A MILITARY ANTHROPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SERB-ALBANIAN DYNAMIC

KONFLIKTY ETNICZNE I AGRESJA ANTROPOLOGICZNA:
ANALIZA DYNAMIKI KONFLIKTU SERBSKO-ALBAŃSKIEGO
W PERSPEKTYWIE ANTROPOLOGII WOJSKOWEJ

ABSTRAKT: Niniejsza analiza bada wielowarstwową naturę historycznego konfliktu serbsko-albańskiego przez pryzmat antropologii wojskowej w ramach stosunków międzynarodowych. Konflikt między Serbami i Albańczykami, który trwał przez ponad sto lat z okresowymi przerwami, ostatecznie zakończył się w połowie 1999 r., kiedy wojska NATO interweniowały w Kosowie. Interwencja ta miała na celu powstrzymanie okrucieństw popełnianych na etnicznych Albańczykach w Kosowie. Pomimo tego, że wojna zakończyła się ponad dwadzieścia lat temu, trwałe skutki tego przedłużającego się konfliktu są nadal widoczne w dzisiejszych narracjach i fizycznych symbolach w obu państwach. Niniejszy artykuł analizuje czynniki, które przyczyniły się do trwającej antropologicznej agresji na Albańczyków z Kosowa w ciągu ostatniego stulecia. W szczególności rozważono rozwój sytuacji politycznej od końca XIX wieku do dziś, koncentrując się na serbskim nacjonalizmie i jego wpływowych zwolennikach. Dążąc do zidentyfikowania wzorców nacjonalistycznych nastrojów, które doprowadziły do wrogiej narracji wobec Albańczyków, niniejsze studium odkrywa sieć czynników historycznych, politycznych i społecznych, które kształtują to środowisko. Wykorzystując antropologię wojskową, zapewniono wgląd w złożony kontekst długotrwałego konfliktu i zilustrowano szereg zróżnicowanych perspektyw, które są istotne dzisiaj

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: Antropologia wojskowa, agresja antropologiczna, nacjonalizm, Kosowo, Albańczycy, Serbia, Jugosławia

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ABSTRACT: This analysis examines the multi-layered nature of the historical Serbian-Albanian conflict through the lens of military anthropology within international relations. The conflict between Serbs and Albanians, which endured for over a century with periodic breaks, finally came to an end in mid-1999 when NATO troops intervened in Kosovo. The intervention was aimed at halting the atrocities being committed against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Despite the war ending over twenty years ago, the lasting effects of this prolonged conflict are still evident in present-day narratives and physical symbols within both states. This article examines the factors that have contributed to the ongoing anthropological aggression against the Albanians of Kosovo over the past century. Specifically, it considers political developments from the end of the 19th century to today, focusing on Serbian nationalism and its influential proponents. Seeking to identify patterns of nationalist sentiment that led to a hostile narrative towards Albanians, this study unravels a web of historical, political and social factors that shape the milieu. Using military anthropology, an insight into the complex context of the long-running conflict is provided, and a range of differentiated perspectives that are relevant today are illustrated.

Keywords: Military Anthropology, Anthropological Aggression, Nationalism, Kosovo, Albanians, Serbia, Yugoslavia

INTRODUCTION

The region this paper discusses today is made up of three different states. To put the cases this paper illustrates into proper context, a brief description of the region's history since the end of the 19th century and how these states came to exist is presented. Notably, the historical perspective will help to analyse how ethnic conflicts and anthropological aggression have played a crucial role in shaping the development of the region overall.

Kosovo and Serbia are two landlocked states located in the Western Balkans. In the Western Balkans region, the two most populous ethnic groups are the Serbs, with a population of over seven million, and the Albanians, with over four million. Most Serbs live in Serbia and the *Republika Srpska* entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. In contrast, the majority of Albanians live in the states of Albania and the Republic of Kosovo. According to official census records, Kosovo's population is over 90% Albanian and less than 1% Serbian. In contrast, Serbia's population is over 80% Serbian and less than 1% Albanian. It is worth noting, however, that these minority statistics are flawed, as both the Albanian minority in Serbia and the Serbian minority in Kosovo boycotted the censuses. In Albania, on the other hand, ethnic Albanians make up over 80%, while Serbs are virtually absent.¹ While in the region of the WB, there are

¹Kosovo Agency of Statistics, *Population by sex, age and ethnic/cultural background 2011*, https://askdata.rks-gov.net/pxweb/en/ASKdata/ASKdata_Census%20population_Census%202011_2%20Republic%20of%20Kosova/census40.px/, [accessed: 23.12.2023].

several languages spoken, Serbian, a Slavic language using a Cyrillic alphabet, is the official language in Serbia and has the status of co-official language in Kosovo, which is spoken in the parts where Serbians reside. On the other hand, Albanian serves as the official language in Albania and Kosovo. Additionally, it holds co-official status in North Macedonia, specifically in regions where the Albanian community constitutes the majority. Albanian is distinct from Slavic languages, forming its branch in the Indo-European language tree. It uses the Latin alphabet, and the Albanian community speaks it in the WB states.²

To better understand some of the factors that affect the political situation and foreign policy of the region's states, it is also essential to understand the religious affiliation of the region's population. In Serbia, more than 90% of the population belongs to Orthodox Christians, while in Kosovo, 90% are Muslims, and in Albania, more than 50% are Muslims.³

For many years, different ethnic groups have lived in the region of the Western Balkans; the region's history is filled with bloody wars, quite often between the people of the area.

During the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire ruled most Western Balkans. Following the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Serbia and Montenegro gained independence. Bosnia was left under the Habsburg Empire, while the remaining parts of the Western Balkans remained under the Ottoman Empire.⁴

The emergence of new Balkan states marked the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the early 1900s. Key events during this period included the two Balkan Wars, Albania's independence, and the Ambassadors Conference in London. In 1912, the Balkan League –an alliance between

Popis Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina - final results*, https://popis.gov.ba/popis2013/doc/RezultatiPopisa_BS.pdf [accessed: 15.04.2023].

Statistical Office of Montenegro, *Census 2011 data – Montenegro*, <http://www.monstat.org/eng/page.php?id=393&pageid=57> [accessed: 16.04.2023].

Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, *Statistical Pocketbook of The Republic of Serbia*, <https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2022/PdfE/G202217015.pdf> [accessed: 23.12.2023].

MakStat, *Census of population, households, and dwellings in the Republic of North Macedonia*, https://www.stat.gov.mk/InfoGraphic/2022/POPIS_DZS_web_EN.pdf [accessed: 23.12.2023].

Institute of Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing*, <http://www.instat.gov.al/al/temat/censet/censet-e-popullsis%C3%AB-dhe-banesave/#tab2> [accessed: 16.04.2023].

² H. Young, *A language family tree - in pictures*, "The Guardian", <https://www.theguardian.com/education/gallery/2015/jan/23/a-language-family-tree-in-pictures> [accessed: 16.04.2023].

³ Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2020, *Statistical Pocketbook...*, *op. cit.*

Institute of Statistics, 2011, *Census of Population and Housing*, *op. cit.*

RFE/RL, *Përkatesia fetare në Kosovë*, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, n/d, <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/perkatesia-fetare-ne-kosove/28798264.html> [accessed: 16.04.2023].

⁴ Fordham University, *Modern History Sourcebook: The Treaty of Berlin, 1878 - Excerpts on the Balkans*, <https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1878berlin.asp>, [accessed: 16.04.2023].

Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria – was formed with the 'blessing' of Russia to fight against the Ottoman Empire. In November 1912, Albania declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire. However, the state faced economic and social problems, internal political crises, and territorial claims from neighbouring countries. The Balkan League aimed to divide Albanian territories to provide Serbia with a port on the Adriatic – a long-held dream of Serbia. The Ambassadors Conference in London in 1913 aimed to negotiate a truce between the Balkan nations and the Ottoman Empire and define the territories of the new states in the region. However, the newly established borders of the Albanian state left almost half of the Albanian population outside its borders. For example, southern territories were given to Greece, and northern ones to Serbia and Montenegro, which Russia supported in their occupation of the regions of the north of Albania. Nevertheless, the victorious Balkan League members turned on each other as they could not find common ground in dividing the captured lands. Furthermore, during the First World War, the Balkan nations again returned to their territorial claims, especially those towards Albania, which followed a chaotic turn of events in the region.⁵

Following World War 1, the Habsburg Empire disintegrated in 1918. Subsequently, some Slavic nations in Southern Europe decided to join the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes by the end of the same year. The kingdom was founded on the principle of equality between Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Slovenes. Despite the name only mentioning three nations, its territory was more significant than the combined territories of these three states today. In terms of territory, this kingdom included parts of present-day Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.⁶ In 1929, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes changed its name to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.⁷

During the Second World War, Yugoslavia was invaded by Nazi Germany and disintegrated, only for it to transform after the war into the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The ethnic groups living in the SFRY were Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians,

⁵ R. Elsie, *The Conference of London*, "Albanian History", http://www.albanianhistory.net/1913_Conference-of-London/index.html [accessed: 14.12.2023].

M. Vickers, *The Albanians. A modern history*, pp. 65-74, <https://archive.org/details/MirandaVickersTheAlbanians/page/n80/mode/1up?view=theater> [accessed 16.12.2023].

M. Glenny, *The Balkans 1804-2012 - Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*, Granta Books, 2012, pp. 246-248.

⁶ M. Glenny, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-407.

⁷ B. J. Fischer, O. J. Schmitt, *Një historie përmbledhur e Shqipërisë*, Artini, 2022, pp. 132-135.

M. Glenny, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-407.

Bosnians and Albanians. The majority of ethnic Albanians in the territory of the former Yugoslavia resided in what was then called the autonomous province of Kosovo, and the Albanians in the autonomous province of Kosovo made up the vast majority of the population of Kosovo. On the political scene, the SFRY, although led by a Communist Party at the time, continuously attempted to balance its relations in the bipolar world.⁸

In Albania, the Communist Party, initially aided by Yugoslav agents in the early years of World War II, successfully gained widespread support. By 1944, it seized power and governed the country for four decades.⁹

Serbian nationalism had always existed, but the communist leader, Josip Broz Tito, controlled it. Following Tito's death, nationalist movements in Yugoslavia emerged from the underground. At that time in Yugoslavia, attention was turned to Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian leader who used Serbian nationalism as a means of maintaining power. His actions and rhetoric were characterised by separatism and chauvinism towards non-Serbs within the federation. The pattern of his decisions and actions explained the aim to achieve the "Great Serbia de facto" project.* Several objectives had to be accomplished to achieve this project. Although the ultimate goal was not reached, fulfilling some goals resulted in disastrous consequences within the Federation. The centralisation of the Republic of Serbia was initiated with the removal of Kosovo and Vojvodina's autonomy. However, these actions led to civil unrest in these regions.¹⁰ Milosevic's next step was the centralisation of the whole of Yugoslavia. However, the plan to centralise Yugoslavia failed and eventually led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia when, on the 25th of June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. A long, bloody war broke out against Croatia and a ten-day war against Slovenia. Serbia aimed to create a new form of Yugoslavia with the remaining territories and the territories where other Serbs lived. In April 1992, a war broke out in Bosnia as well after the country declared its independence. As a result, a three-year bloody war continued in Bosnia, where inhumane mass crimes were committed mainly against Bosniaks. On the other hand, Serbia and Montenegro agreed to continue using the term Yugoslavia. In 1992, they created the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which the new

⁸ K. Wölfer, *Serbia sees itself as heir to Yugoslavia's nonaligned tradition*, GIS Reports Online, <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/yugoslavia-serbia-nonalignment/> [accessed: 16.12.2023].

⁹ M. Glenny, *op. cit.*, pp. 560-570.

¹⁰ N. Tromp, *Prosecuting Slobodan Milošević: The Unfinished Trial*, Routledge, 2016, pp.33-35, 159-173. Amire Qamili, *Ish-kryetari i Kuvendit të Kosovës, tregon historinë e shpalljes së Deklaratës Kushtetuese të 2 korrikut 1990*, <https://kallxo.com/lajm/ish-kryetari-i-kuvendit-te-kosoves-tregon-historine-e-shpalljes-se-deklarates-kushtetuese-te-2-korrikut-1990/> [accessed 16.12.2023].

constitution provided allowed new Serbian territories to join the state.¹¹ By 1998, the war also broke out in Kosovo when the guerrilla fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army declared war on Serbia with the aim of liberation ting Kosovo from Serbian occupation. Serbia responded with a brutal campaign against the Albanian civilian population of Kosovo, where the Serbian forces committed several massacres, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. To achieve a peace deal, the international community started peace negotiations in Rambouillet, France, at the beginning of 1999. However, Milosevic refused to agree with the terms presented, even when he was warned that this would have its consequences. Therefore, NATO launched Operation Allied Force, a military campaign against Serbia, to stop the ethnic cleansing occurring in Kosovo. This campaign was mainly aerial bombing and lasted for 78 days, from the 24th of March 1999 until the 10th of June 1999, after which Milosevic declared the capitulation of Serbia. After that, the UN Security Council adopted the 1244 Resolution in 1999, which placed Kosovo under the temporary administration of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), authorised NATO to conduct a mission of peacekeeping, and waived the right of Belgrade to govern Kosovo, and with the final status of Kosovo to be set in the future.¹² Regarding the situation in Kosovo, in 2005, the Contact Group consisting of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK, and the U.S. formulated what was known as the "Guiding Principles" for the future status of Kosovo. The principles included various provisions: no return to the pre-1999 situation and no change of borders, division or unification of Kosovo with a neighbouring country. On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia and committed

¹¹ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, *Report on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia*, <https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=7052&lang=en> [accessed: 16.12.2023]. M. Glenny, *op. cit.*, pp. 634 – 662.

*The Hague Prosecution of the ICTY used the term “the Great Serbia de facto” because this aim was not explicitly used; however, the actions taken were moving towards this goal.

Government of Slovenia, *Path to Slovene State*, <http://www.slovenija2001.gov.si/10years/path/#:~:text=In%20the%20spring%20of%201991,with%20certain%20other%20related%20acts> [accessed: 26.12.2023].

Croatian Parliament, *25 June - Independence Day*, <https://www.sabor.hr/en/about-parliament/history/important-dates/25-june-independence-day> [accessed: 16.12.2023].

National Museum of American Diplomacy, *April 1992: War Breaks out in Bosnia*, <https://diplomacy.state.gov/online-exhibits/diplomacy-ends-a-war-the-dayton-accords/april-1992-war-breaks-out-in-bosnia/> [accessed: 16.12.2023].

¹² Parliamentary Assembly..., *op. cit.*

T. Judah, *Kosovo What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 61, 65-92.

NATO, Kosovo Air Campaign (March-June 1999), Operation Allied Force https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm [accessed: 17.12.2023].

to its obligations under the Ahtisaari Plan, which foresaw independence under international supervision in the first years of its statehood.¹³

As this article will analyse the Serbian-Albanian conflict throughout the years through the lens of Military Anthropology, it is essential to understand its role in fighting wars. Military anthropology is vital in gaining a strategic advantage against the opponents during the war. While it can often be used in a positive approach, military anthropology can also be used to gain intelligence in terms of the social aspects of the population. Anthropological intelligence is a tool that helps a party to identify local leaders and understand their role in these societies, making it easier to know how to use them to achieve its goals. Anthropological aggression refers to tendencies and actions aimed at controlling the information space of another group or state. Long-term goals and indirect attacks characterise it. This aggression can also include actions focused on the economy, education, academia, and politics. Therefore, it is essential to understand the ten stages of anthropological aggression according to Boroch:

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1. First stage — emphasising the aggressor's interests in the critical areas of the life of the state of the attacked party.
2. The second stage is gaining informational and ideological advantages.
3. The third stage is economic, political, and informational domination.
4. Fourth stage — strengthening of ideological, political, economic, and cultural relationships with the aggressor through the actions of the brainwashed citizens of the attacked state.
5. The fifth stage is formal and informal political representation.
6. The sixth stage is the rights of ethnic or national minorities.
7. The seventh stage is the protection of ethnic or national minorities by the aggressor.
8. Eighth stage — civil disobedience, social unrest, and paramilitary activities.
9. Ninth stage — encroachment of aggressive forces to protect democracy, human rights, ethnic or national minorities.

¹³ T. Judah, *op. cit.*, pp 109-116, 141.

United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kosovo%20S2007%20168.pdf> [accessed: 20.12.2023].

¹⁴ R. Boroch, *Military anthropology — specialisation frame*, "Wiedza Obronna", 2021, Vol. 274 No. 1, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.34752/2021-d274>.

10. The tenth stage is the process of adapting the society of the attacked state to a new reality, fighting the opposition, for example, through an aggressive ethnic-national policy (e.g., economic resettlement) or using secret services.

Additionally, the resistance of the citizens of the attacked states is called the anthropological defence.

NATIONALISM, CULTURAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION

While language was the primary source of identity for Albanians, for Serbs and the Ottoman Empire, religious affiliation was the primary tool used to classify people (for example, Muslim, Greek Orthodox, etc.). Under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, many ethnic groups that were part of it were allowed to establish schools in their native language, except for Albanians. This continued for many years paradoxically even in Kosovo, where Serbs were a minority, Serbian-language schools had already been opened. While for Albanians, the religious differences did not affect the relationship between them or with the other ethnicities, for Serbs, religion was a critical topic. Prince Milos Obrenovic, who ruled Serbia from 1815 to 1839, initiated a ruthless campaign to expel Muslim Albanians from the territory which he ruled. Moreover, several Serbian writers have used the religious argument to support their claims that any trace of traditional or religious practices among the Albanians of Kosovo, which originated from the Orthodox religion, proved that they were Orthodox Serbs who had been "Albanianized". Among many writers who used this theory were Milos Milojevic and Spiridon Gopcevic, the latter also appraised by Serbs as the "father of Serbian political ethnography". In his books, he wrote that all Albanians of Kosovo were Serbs who had been Albanianized, a claim which had been proven to be false, and the books he wrote were based mainly on his ideas and not on data or field research. Gustav Weigand, a German expert on the Balkans, called his books "a mass of crude lies" However, this did not stop the Serbian state from sponsoring the publishing and translation of these books in different languages so they could be used for propaganda.¹⁵

GARASANIN'S DRAFT PLAN AND ITS MILITARY ANTHROPOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

By the mid of the 19th century (1840-1850), when the Albanian national movements had just begun, national politicians from Serbia had already been developing their expansionist plans

¹⁵ Malcolm N., *Kosovo. A short History*, pp. 181-201.

for their states. Ilija Garasanin, one of the most famous politicians of Serbia at the time, wrote the famous Draft Plan (Nacertanije in Serbian). This Draft Plan, which was kept secret for many years, aimed to expand Serbia's borders all around the Balkans region to transform Serbia into a hegemon of the region. In the Draft Plan, Garasanin highlighted the obstacles Serbia faced regarding economic independence and development as a landlocked country. Hence, he insisted that Serbia must secure access to the Adriatic Sea. Serbia would have to take land from its neighbouring states or nations to ensure this access. Since moving too much upward in the north, Serbia would have to face the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Garasanin focused on the territories in the south as more favourable, including Albanian territories. The Draft Plan also focused on Serbian supremacy in the region, where Serbia should be the leader and protector of all the Slavs of the south and Balkans. If parts of the population were unsure of their ethnic belonging, they would have to be slowly assimilated into Serbs. To achieve these goals, Garasanin suggested that agents should be sent to the region to collect information on the people, their culture and mentality, military capacities, and the territory's characteristics so the means can be adjusted accordingly. These agents would focus on the territories where Garasanin aimed to expand the Serbian territory, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and northern Albania, including Kosovo.¹⁶ Therefore, such an example of conducting research and collecting intelligence on Albanian society and its social aspects can be considered anthropological research and intelligence gathering for anthropological aggression.¹⁷

Another point that Garasanin emphasises in Nacertanije/The Draft Plan is the close cooperation between the Orthodox and the Catholics to allow believers of both religions to agree on unifying their national policy. Hence, to further advance their purposes, the Serbian state, and quite often even Russia itself, financed and supported the opening of new public schools and socio-religious institutions in the territories of the Ottoman Empire, particularly Kosovo. The Ottoman Empire allowed the establishment of new schools and those to be held in the local language, apart from the Albanian language. Therefore, the Serbian

¹⁶ M. Glenny, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-57.

I. Garasanin, The nacertanije (draft). The programme of Serbian foreign and national policy at the end of 1844, Internet Library of Serb Culture, https://www.rastko.rs/istorija/batakovic/batakovic-nacertanije_eng.html [accessed: 20.12.2023].

N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-201.

¹⁷ R. Boroch, *op. cit.*

minorities in Kosovo were more privileged in this regard compared to the Albanian majority. The Serbian teachers sent to Kosovo to lecture on religion also used these opportunities to promote Serbian national and religious ideas, which led to a clash with the Greek Orthodox Church, which was leading the Orthodox hierarchy in Kosovo at the time.¹⁸ Henceforth, it is crucial to understand how these solid historical ties and affiliations of Serbian nationalism with the Serbian Orthodox Church have been used to influence and impose a political agenda of hegemony over the region.

After establishing the socio-religious institutions in Kosovo, Serbia was prepared to enter the next phase of the Garasanin's Draft Plan, sending its people to collect information parallel to propagating the Serbian nationalist ideas. By the end of the 19th century, Serbia had sent three diplomats to Kosovo whose mission was to collect information, analyse, and try to understand Albanian culture in general for their military and nationalistic interests. As part of their mission, they also published several books regarding Kosovo. In these books, among the factual data presented, the mission of these diplomats was also to promote their anti-Albanian narrative by alienating them as the only people different from the region's ethnic groups by promoting Orthodoxy as the Slavic identity and by blaming Muslim Albanians for many of the issues faced by the Serbs. This way, they could lay their narrative towards the Albanians, so when they decide to oppress and expel them, it would be easier for everyone to comprehend and accept.¹⁹

Branislav Nusic was one of those three diplomats, and in one of his books named "Kosovo: description of the Country and the People" he claims that the Orthodox religion was pure of Serbs and that Albanians could not be Orthodox, but only Muslims. Therefore, by promoting this narrative, he aimed to create this division based on religion, that an Albanian being an Orthodox was not something ordinary. Thus, he would target Albanian Orthodox by urging them to identify themselves as Serbs, and later on, as history shows, many Muslim Albanians were 'misidentified' by the Serbian state as Turkish. In contrast, Branislav Nusic claims in his book that a tiny percentage of Turkish or Ottomans reside in Kosovo. On the other hand, Nusic confirms that Albanians constitute most of the population in Kosovo. However, he claims that most of these Albanians are Serbs who have been 'Albanianized' over time.²⁰ When describing

¹⁸ N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-201.

¹⁹ B. Nusic, *Kosovo. Description of the country and the people*, pp. Intro.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 101-111.

the population in Kosovo, Nusic could not always go against all the known facts. Therefore, he confirms that Dardans, an Illyrian tribe, has resided in the region of Kosovo. While trying to avoid directly admitting that the Albanians are the descendants of the Dardans and Illyrians, Nusic claims that the “Vlach” people are the descendants and that there is also a group which have managed to protect the Illyrian language are the ‘arnauts’ or ‘shkipetars’, which are other words used for Albanians (the first one a Turkish word for Albanians, and the latter one being used a slur by Serbian people towards Albanians). However, the author purposely tries to create a division between groups of Albanians. When talking about the ethnic groups which constitute the population of Kosovo, he numbers Albanians or Arnauts and Albanianized Serbs as most of the population, along with Serbs and other small minorities like Bosniaks, Jews, etc. Furthermore, Nusic tries to portray Albanians as savages and uncultured people while Serbs as a more civilised nation.²¹ While this was not only the claim of Nusic, such claims were also made by other Serbian writers, such as the case of Vladan Djordjvic, who was also a former President of the Council of Ministers in Serbia, who portrayed Albanians as sub-humans, who also had tails just like monkeys.²²

While the Draft Plan of Garasanin might initially seem as simple as the writing of a patriot who is planning a doctrine for the development of his nation, the long-term goals and means suggested to achieve its goals explain the expansionist and hegemonic ideas of Garasanin.

ALBANIAN NATIONAL AWAKENING AND THE WW1

In Serbia, the Draft Plan of Garasanin represented one of the most essential concepts of Serbian nationalism. To Albanians, on the other hand, the national movements came later as a reaction to the actions of their neighbours and the Ottoman Empire. Albanians saw that the reforms of the Ottoman Empire and the territorial claims of Serbia were threatening them. Hence, in 1878, the Albanian League of Prizren was created by the most critical Albanian figures who initially called for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. Later, they would voice the need for an independent state of Albania to save the territories where Albanians lived before Serbia captured them and which were out of Albanian control. Since the Ottoman Empire saw this as a threat, the League of Prizren was quickly and harshly crushed. Nevertheless, the League of Prizren was important since it was the first national organisation of that kind, which showed

²¹ Ibidem, pp. 69-79.

²² N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

the rise of the national consciousness.²³ Anyway, at the beginning of the 20th century, the Western Balkans region saw the weakening of the Ottoman Empire and the increase in the nationalistic sentiments among the populations of this region. For the Albanian community, this increase in the nationalistic sentiment was manifested initially with the pan-Albanian congress in Manastir, where a unified Latin alphabet for the Albanian language was agreed upon, only for it to culminate with the Declaration of Independence on the 28th of November 1912.²⁴

As the whole region was still in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, Albania was also uncertain as it could not organise its borders formally. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914, in Sarajevo, which led to the starting of WW 1, reignited the territorial ambitions, where Serbia saw Albania as a failed product which had to be taken care of to achieve its goal of reaching the access to the Adriatic Sea and expand its territory. Albanians, on the other hand, saw this occasion more as an opportunity to fight the Serbian and Montenegrin territorial ambitions and change the borderlines into something which would represent the ethnic lines of the region.²⁵ Nevertheless, the Albanian state managed to keep its territorial integrity within the borders of 1913, thanks to the strong support of the U.S. during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.²⁶ On the other hand, Kosovo was now part of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. There have been plenty of discussions about the efficacy and expansion of the political concept of the Yugoslav kingdom/state. Member nations within the Kingdom, including Croatia, Slovenia, Kosovo, and Serbia, had significantly varying goals and aspirations. Croatia and Slovenia sought equitable treatment; Kosovo intended to join the Albanian state or at least secure equal rights, whereas Serbia strived for total control over the Kingdom.²⁷

CUBRILOVIC AND THE MASSIVE EXPULSION OF ALBANIANS

²³ T. Judah, *op. cit.*, pp 61, 65-92.

NATO, *Kosovo Air Campaign...*, *op. cit.*

²⁴ B. J. Fischer, O. J. Schmitt, *op cit.*, pp. 120, 125-128.

²⁵ M. Vickers, *op. cit.*, pp. 86.

²⁶ B. J. Fischer, O. J. Schmitt, *op cit.*, pp. 132-135.

M. Glenny, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-407.

²⁷ N. Kreizer, *Yugoslavia, 1918: Birth of a dead state*, <https://www.dw.com/en/yugoslavia-1918-birth-of-a-dead-state/a-46538595> [accessed: 17.12.2023].

The ideology of Garasanin strongly influenced Serbian politicians and nationalists, which explains Serbia's goal to lead the region. To achieve this goal, Serbian politicians changed the region's demographics, claiming a more significant majority of the kingdom and a stronger position. This resulted from a growing sense of national identity and the creation of new nation-states. Since the main target of these actions by Serbian politicians were Albanians, the other reason was the potential for Albanian nationalism to gain momentum in the future, which could hinder Serbia's long-term goals of taking complete control of Kosovo and even northern Albania. The main discussion topics among the Serbian elite during the 1930s were the tools needed to achieve these goals. In this regard, the plan of Vaso Cubrilovic for the mass expulsion of Albanians gained wide attention. Cubrilovic, who was part of the terrorist group that assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was now a respected professor at the University of Belgrade.²⁸

In his proposed plan, Cubrilovic argues that Albanians have been the main problem for Serbs for centuries. Cubrilovic considered that the colonisation process was not giving the desired results; it had been a prolonged process, and the main issue for Cubrilovic was the lack of professionalism of the Serbs who were in charge of enforcing the colonisation process. In contrast, colonisation as a process for him was very ordinary. He claims that the previous colonisation processes implemented towards Albanian villages in Toplica (villages **intoday's** Serbia) after 1878 were very effective and successful, and the new processes should follow that example. Therefore, Cubrilovic suggests that the army should lead the process of colonisation and that the solution to this problem is using brute force by the state. The first proposal of Cubrilovic is the mass expulsion of Albanians to Turkey or Albania. While Cubrilovic is aware that this might trigger some reaction from Italy or other states, **hecompares** it with the actions of Germany towards the Jews and Russia's expulsion **ofmillions** of people, for which the world did not act until that time and claims that Serbia can do the same towards the Albanians and is also convinced that no one will start a world war just because of the expulsion of the Albanians. Furthermore, he is convinced that Italy is too preoccupied with its problems and won't have time to pressure Serbia for these actions, but the problem will be if France and Britain react. In this case, Cubrilovic suggests enticing both these powers with the arguments

²⁸ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; FRY/KOSOVO: Serbian plans for ethnic cleansing; historical background and precedents*, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfa/28/0031606.htm> [accessed: 17.12.2023].

that they can use the Serbian territory for geostrategic purposes in the future once the Albanians are not there. Regarding the anthropological approach, Cubrilovic acknowledges local leaders, religious figures, and the clergy's influence over the Albanian population. He proposes using these figures to persuade the Albanians **to leave** Kosovo through bribery or intimidation. Therefore, this is another example of the anthropological aggression towards the Albanian population through the use of the society's local leaders to achieve its goals. Furthermore, he recommends employing media **to advertise** the advantages and positive aspects of life in Turkey for those who have already resettled there and established a new life. Support should also be sought from private individuals and institutions, such as doctors, professors, and other cultural institutions. The author also suggests that the state subsidise removal expenses, including transportation costs. As a **second** step, Cubrilovic means increasing police brutality and persecution against ethnic Albanians. He proposes taking measures to prevent resistance among the population, such as burning down Albanian villages and cities, like what Serbia had done secretly since 1878. It is important to note that the suggestions imply that any actions taken should **be targeted** at the poor and the rich, who often finance resistance among the population. Measures should also include removing Albanians from public offices, beating and threatening their religious leaders, increasing taxes, imposing heavy fines for small things such as leaving dogs unchained, new rules for keeping livestock, and many other measures that would make life so unbearable for Albanians that they would prefer to go. He suggests seeking support from the Chetniks, a Serbian nationalist movement, and arming the settlers to fight the Albanians, creating a proxy war in which the state need not be directly involved. He also suggests that the new settlers in Kosovo should be Montenegrins and Serbs so they can dominate the ethnic groups in Kosovo. Furthermore, sponsorship should be given to the new settlers so that they can plan their lives there and not leave after a few years.²⁹

Cubrilovic's ideas and proposals were implemented, inciting a reaction from the Albanian community. The Albanian population strongly opposed Serbia and Yugoslavia's rule, leading to the establishment of the *kaçaks* movement. The '*kaçaks*' were Albanian fighters who fought

²⁹ V. Cubrilovic, *The Expulsion of the Albanians. Memorandum presented on March 7, 1939 in Belgrade*, <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20170517/105978/HHRG-115-FA14-20170517-SD002.pdf> [accessed: 20.12.2023].

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Memorandum submitted...*, *op. cit.*
N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp 264-288.

against Serbia while living in the mountains away from their homes and families. Through their actions, the group attracted the attention of the Yugoslav state, which responded by seizing their lands and portraying them as criminals. However, the 'kaçaks' role was not limited to fighting; they also promoted a political ideology by presenting their demands to the Yugoslav state. These demands included putting a stop to the ongoing colonization process that had been targeting Albanians and their lands for several years. The group focused on their political activity; therefore, they created a set of rules for the kaçaks to follow, which, among others, included not attacking Serbian civilians unless they held a **weapon** and were trying to fight, and not attacking churches, villages, or civilian houses.³⁰

WORLD WAR II - COMMUNISM AGAINST NATIONALISM

In 1939 Italy invaded Albania, while Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact, with several clauses that allowed it to maintain its "neutrality", only for it later to be invaded by Nazi Germany and disintegrated. During these times, parts of Kosovo were transferred to Albania's Italian-controlled territories. The Axis powers generally supported several nationalistic movements in the Balkans. Serbia saw the establishment of a nationalist military group called the Chetniks, which fought to create a purely Serbian state. Initially, this group fought against the Axis powers; however, later, they also decided to cooperate with the Nazis and the Axis. The leader of this group was Draza Mihailovic, a loyalist of the Yugoslav monarchy, and the group was made of ultranationalist Serbs and Montenegrins, who promoted the idea of Greater Serbia and the expulsion of all the non-Serbs. At the time, the main enemies of the Chetniks were the Communists, as they seemed to denounce the colonisation programs and the idea of Greater Serbia. The presence of the Communist Party in Kosovo was relatively small. Since it was mainly made of Slav activists, it did not get the support of the Albanians as it was seen as a Slav/Serbian entity. For Albanians, on the other hand, the National Front was one of the leading nationalist movements, which the communists vehemently opposed. Even though there were attempts to join forces between the National Front and the National Liberation Movement (Albanian communist political movement), the call for an independent Albania of the National Front was vehemently opposed by the Yugoslav Communist party, who controlled the Albanian

³⁰ N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp 264-288.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Memorandum submitted...*, *op. cit.*

communists as well. Therefore, no agreement was reached, and the National Front was now an enemy of the Communist Party. The communists of Yugoslavia decided to make some concessions when it came to the nationalism of the Kosovo Albanians as a means to attract them to join their party. However, they were very ruthless to the non-communist Albanian nationalist movements. The main idea behind these concessions was so they could counter the other Albanian nationalist movements in Kosovo. After the war, even Albanians who fought on the side of the communists turned against the Yugoslav communist party. They felt threatened by the Chetnik forces and refused to leave their hometowns to fight elsewhere. Consequently, the Communist troops suppressed the revolt of the Albanians. Thus, it is evident that the Communist forces were not concerned with supporting the Albanian community but aimed to extend their authority over it. By the end of the Second World War, the Allied Forces considered Tito's communist guerillas (Yugoslav Communist Party - KPJ) as the primary resistance force in Yugoslavia, which motivated the KPJ to unleash its brutal campaign against all the nationalist movements while gaining control over most of the region of the Balkans. Once again, the region's borders were reshaped, and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was now transformed into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Part of this new federation were the republics of Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, while Kosovo and Vojvodina later got the status of autonomous regions within Serbia.³¹

THE NEW YUGOSLAVIA

Although the communists took control of Yugoslavia and fought against nationalist movements, some key figures in Yugoslavian communism after World War II were Serbian nationalists who rebranded themselves as communists. One such example is Vaso Cubrilovic, who is known for his plan to remove Albanians from Kosovo and replace them with Serbs. After the war, he became a communist adviser and an influential personality in the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences. He proposed expelling Albanians and other non-Serb minorities as a solution to the minority problem in Yugoslavia. The anti-Albanian sentiment in Yugoslavia, particularly

³¹ N. Tromp, *op. cit.*, pp 142.

M. Glenny, *op. cit.*, pp. 470-477, 485, 529-530.

B. Fischer, O.J. Schmitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-176, 185-187.

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *The Minister in Yugoslavia (Lane) to the Secretary of State*, Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1941, Europe, vol. II, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v02/d957> [accessed: 17.12.2023].

N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-313.

in Serbia, was strong. During the 1960s, Dobrica Cosic, a Serbian writer and high official of the League of Communists, criticised Serbia's approach towards Kosovo and Albanians. He suggested a harsher approach and raised concerns over Albanian nationalism as a threat to Serbia and Serbs. However, he was later expelled from the party. Cosic became relevant again during the 1980s and 1990s.³²

The role of these nationalists in communist rule could be noticed as Kosovo was the least developed region in Yugoslavia, with low education levels. Following World War II, there were only around 270 Albanian schools in Kosovo, resulting in extremely high illiteracy rates. The authorities used these factors as a tool to pressure Albanians and make their lives unbearable, ultimately leading to their migration. It is worth noting that this was also part of Cubrilovic's plan. As a result of the extreme conditions, there was an increase in the number of Albanian emigrants after the 1960s who went abroad in search of a better life. Most of these emigrants were unskilled and poorly educated, recruited on special arrangements and contracts as temporary workers. Although programs aimed to repatriate these emigrants, they brought their families to these countries and settled there. For a long time, migration was the only option for Albanian families seeking economic stability and a better quality of life.³³ During the 1960s, Kosovo experienced significant developments while the Albanian population began to organise and protest against discrimination, demanding their rights. By the end of 1968, numerous demonstrations were held throughout Kosovo, calling for establishing the Republic of Kosovo, ending colonisation policies, and creating an Albanian university. The police responded ruthlessly to these demonstrators, resulting in one death and multiple imprisonments. To control the situation, some changes were made regarding the situation in Kosovo. However, the problem remained far from average, as was the case in other regions of Yugoslavia. Some changes included the dismissal of Aleksandar Rankovic following a breakdown in relations with the communist party. Rankovic was the Minister of Interior responsible for violent repression measures against the Albanian population. Additionally, the pejorative term 'siptari' to refer to Albanians was discontinued, and they would now be

³² Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Memorandum submitted...*, *op. cit.*

N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-333.

³³ M. Mustafa, M. Kotorri, P. Gashi, A. Gashi V. Demukaj, *Diaspora and Migration Policies*, Forum 2015, Prishtina 2007, pp. 27, <https://www.riinvestinstitute.org/uploads/files/2016/October/17/ang1476702881.pdf> [accessed 19.04.2023].

V. Cubrilovic, *op. cit.*

referred to as 'Albanac' instead. Furthermore, some higher education faculties previously part of the University of Belgrade were transformed into faculties that would begin teaching in Albanian, leading to the establishment of the University of Prishtina. Despite these changes, the fact remains that Serbs and Montenegrins, who made up only 21% of the population, held over 50% of the top positions.³⁴

‘THE SERBIAN ACADEMY OF NATIONALISM’; THE ROLE OF THE SERBIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND MILOSEVIC

The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) significantly promoted Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia. During the 1980s, the Academy focused on the 'Albanian issue'. They surveyed during that time with several Serbs who migrated from Kosovo to Serbia. Their findings claimed most of those people left Kosovo due to pressure from Albanians.³⁵ However, SANU's involvement in political life did not stop there. In the mid-1980s, SANU drafted a Memorandum calling for urgent action to change the ethnic balance in Kosovo, favouring Serbs and Montenegrins. This Memorandum, often viewed as a manifesto of Serbian nationalism, claimed that Serbs in Kosovo were under threat from Albanians and that the Serbian nation, in general, was under threat from other nations in the region. The situation brought back into the spotlight the Serbian writer Dobrica Cosic, then president of SANU, known for his anti-Albanian views.³⁶

There was a general increase in nationalism throughout Yugoslavia, but Serbian nationalism, with Milosevic as its leader, proved to be the most brutal. While the SANU memorandum was initially widely criticised, Milosevic was the only one who refrained from openly criticising it, another indicator of the close relationship between Milosevic and Cosic. According to the ICTY indictment in the Milosevic case, this document laid the groundwork for his primary intention: creating “Great Serbia de facto”. Although the goal of a Great Serbia was never achieved, implementing the strategies designed to advance this agenda had devastating consequences. In June 1989, Milosevic visited Kosovo for the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. His speech at this event went down in history as the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia. In

³⁴ N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 314- 333.

³⁵ Ibidem.

³⁶ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Memorandum submitted...*, *op. cit.*

N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-333.

N. Tromp, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-171.

the presence of nearly a million Serbs from all over Yugoslavia, Milosevic used this moment to publicly declare his intention to "save the Serbs" from oppression by other nations within the Yugoslav state and to call for preparations for war publicly. The whole event was filled with Serbian nationalist chants and anti-Albanian slogans. This speech was a confirmation of Milosevic's agreement with the SANU memorandum, and in a way, it legitimised the discrimination against Kosovo Albanians.³⁷ These actions and rhetoric highlighted the harmful consequences of pursuing the agenda of a "Great Serbia", which continued to pose human security concerns for ethnic Albanians, making them a target not only of the state but of the society as well.

The pressure towards the Albanians did not only come from the government level; the narrative of the "Albanian problem" had also been highly embedded into the mindset of the Serbian population. During the "state of emergency" declared by the Serbian state in the late 1980s, Serbs in the federal state of Serbia, including Kosovo and Vojvodina, organised massive protests demanding that the government take action. Conspiracy theories were created to portray the Albanians as those who wanted to bring down Yugoslavia and had expansionist plans. The Albanian population was widely regarded as an inferior class of citizens in Yugoslavia, while the Serbs saw themselves as the legitimate nation and successor to the federation. As the discrimination and segregation by the Yugoslav state towards the Albanians continued, government officials did not hesitate to express their hostile positions publicly.³⁸

This was the case, for instance, when politicians such as Seselj called for the expulsion of all Albanians from Kosovo, or when Arkan claimed that millions of Albanians had been arriving from Albania in recent years and that they were "tourists" in Kosovo.³⁹

The state persecution of the Albanian patriots did not stop within the borders of Yugoslavia. As the Albanian diaspora was deeply involved in politics, they were also targeted by the Yugoslav authorities. Hence, their activities and rallies in the democratic countries regarding the political situation back home were crucial in providing a clear picture of the political situation there. The Albanian diaspora was perceived as a threat to the communist regimes back in Yugoslavia. Hence, these political activities often ended up in the most tragic ways for

³⁷ N. Tromp, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-171.

³⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Yugoslavia - human rights abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992*, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/yugoslavia/> [accessed: 18.12.2023].

³⁹ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Memorandum submitted...*, *op. cit.* N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-333.

them and their families. After years of political activities in exile, such as organising rallies and protests for the rights of Albanian people in Kosovo, on January 17, 1982, brothers Jusuf and Bardhosh Gërvalla, and Kadri Zeka were killed in an assassination attempt which took place in Untergruppenbach, Germany. The assassination was considered the new culmination of the secret war between the Yugoslav security agents and the opposition, and the Belgrade Government had declared war on the Albanians coming from Kosovo in exile.⁴⁰

Discrimination against Albanians worsened with the enactment of laws that directly or indirectly affected their well-being and lives, increasing their marginalisation and threatening their human security. Several laws were presented and adopted that have set in motion a new kind of colonisation of Kosovo by providing more favourable conditions for Serbs and Montenegrins to move to Kosovo, such as assistance in building houses and other complementary infrastructure, providing them with jobs in the public sector, etc. While there were massive dismissals from the Albanian community, Serbs and Montenegrins filled the vacancies. These dismissals included police officers, judges, prosecutors, and other judiciary members. This has made it very difficult for the Albanian community to seek justice or even to find basic security within the institutions of the state. Hospitals in Albanian-populated areas have also been closed, citing the poor economic situation. Moreover, even the population policies in place were discriminatory against the Albanians, such as the provision of lower allowances for families with more than three children or the policy to reduce the birth rate in Kosovo.⁴¹

Other laws adopted by the government made it impossible for the Albanian community to continue their official communication in institutions and education in their native language, Albanian. New rules imposed the use of Serbo-Croatian as the official language, leading to the shutdown of universities and other educational institutions for Albanians. The Kosovo Academy of Sciences and the Institute of History were placed under the Serbian Academy of Sciences,

⁴⁰ RTV 21, *37 years since the murder of brothers Gërvalla and Kadri Zeka*, <http://en.rtv21.tv/37-vjet-nga-vrasja-e-vellezerve-gervalla-dhe-kadri-zekes/> [accessed: 18.12.2023].

⁴¹ T. Mazowiecki, UN. Secretary-General, UN. Commission on Human Rights. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia *The situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia: note / by the Secretary-General*, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/168436?ln=en> [accessed: 17.12.2023].

Human Rights Watch, *Yugoslavia...*, *op. cit.*

I. Rugova, R. Dole, *27 vite nga vizita historike e senatorit Bob Dole në Kosovë (Video)*, <https://telegrafi.com/27-vite-nga-vizita-historike-e-senatorit-bob-dole-ne-kosove-video/> [accessed: 17.12.2023].

making it impossible for the Albanian community to learn about their history.⁴² These discriminatory measures further undermined the human security of the Albanian community by suppressing their cultural identity and impeding their access to education.

POLITICAL REPRESSION AND LACK OF FREEDOM

Following Albania's independence and the Balkan Wars, the status of Kosovo became unclear. Legally, Kosovo was never incorporated into Serbia. However, Yugoslavia was in control of this region. In 1928, the Yugoslav Nationality Law required Kosovo Albanians to register as 'non-Slavs who have become nationals of the Kingdom.' Albanians in Yugoslavia were denied the use of their language. They saw their lands taken by the state under the guise of agrarian reforms aimed at redistributing land from the Ottoman Empire. However, this served only as a cover for the mass colonisation of Kosovo with Slavic speakers. These and other forms of harassment were used to incite the mass migration of Albanians from Kosovo to shift the demographics in favour of Serbs. Another goal of the colonisation was to punish the 'kaçaks' by taking their lands and giving them to the Serbs. At the same time, their families would be sent to internment camps all over Serbia. Even if it was not possible to expel all the Albanians, the aim was to ensure that only those who were willing to live under Serbian rule would remain. However, the colonisation process was carried out in a detailed manner to settle all Serbian and Montenegrin people in Kosovo near main roads, developed regions, and even close to the borders with Albania. This was done to prevent close communication between Albanians and to isolate the Albanian community within their villages, away from the developed regions and cities. Several decrees were approved listing individuals eligible to settle in Kosovo. The list mainly included Serbian soldiers, volunteers, and members of the Chetnik group. Additionally, a special decree allowed for the immediate seizure and transfer of land belonging to kaçaks to any of the groups mentioned above. The colonisers received extensive support from the state, including free settlement in new lands, free land, and subsidies for transporting their belongings. In 1935, a new rule was approved that required landowners to provide a document from Yugoslav authorities proving their land ownership. However, not

⁴² T. Mazowiecki, *op. cit.*

The University of Prishtina, *Special Edition - University of Prishtina 1970 – 2005*, <https://fiek.uni-pr.edu/desk/inc/media/C5F19FED-C351-4473-8F40-C6E7865526C9.pdf> [accessed 20.12.2023].

many Albanians possessed such documents. Consequently, over 6,000 people lost their land in the Drenica region alone, which equates to 23 villages.⁴³

The Yugoslav authorities aimed to suppress the kaçak movement. At one point, they even supplied weapons to the Serbian population in Kosovo, which did not help in improving relations between the two ethnic groups. The authorities also disregarded other Albanian political parties when they were established. These political parties aimed to work with the state to reach agreements regarding using the Albanian language and halt colonisation. However, they faced rejection from the state, and their leaders were even arrested and murdered, as was the case of Ferat Draga. Moreover, state authorities started implementing Vaso Cubrilovic's plans and ideas for the expulsion of the Albanians. In 1933, Yugoslavia and Turkey began discussing a potential agreement to transfer all the Turks residing in Yugoslavia to Turkey. Since Yugoslavia considered all Muslims to be Turks, this agreement primarily targeted the Albanians. As part of this agreement, Yugoslavia agreed to pay a certain amount for every family settling in Turkey. It is worth noting that between 1918 and 1941, over 100,000 Albanians migrated from Kosovo. Although these projects were halted by the onset of the Second World War, it is important to mention their historical significance.⁴⁴

After the Second World War, the status of Kosovo, again, remained unclear, however Serbian communist troops were present in the region. Between the 8th and 10th of July 1945, the Regional People's Council of Kosovo was organised which had more than 130 delegates, of whom only 32 were of Albanian nationality. This unelected body adopted the resolution legitimising the annexation of Kosovo by Serbia, and more than a month later, the Serbian People's Assembly voted on the law establishing the 'Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija' as part of the Serbian state.⁴⁵ Cubrilovic, on the other hand, who transformed from a Serbian nationalist to a communist after WW2, became one of the most influential figures in the SANU and served as a minister in various departments of the Yugoslavian government. His plans to expel all Albanians were continued after an agreement with Turkey to take in Albanian Muslims

⁴³ N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-288.

⁴⁴ V. Cubrilovic, *op. cit.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Memorandum submitted...*, *op. cit.*

N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp 264 – 288.

⁴⁵ N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp 314 –333.

A. Marmullaku, *77 vjet nga aneksimi i dhunshëm i Kosovës nga Serbia - Kuvendi i Prizrenit dhe delegatët që votuan pro*, <https://albanianpost.com/77-vjet-nga-aneksimi-i-dhunshem-i-kosoves-nga-serbia-kuvendi-i-prizrenit-dhe-delegatet-shqiptare-qe-votuan-pro/> [accessed: 10.01.2024].

in 1953. Furthermore, state authorities encouraged Muslim Albanians to identify themselves as Turks, once again equating the term with the Islam religion. This resulted in a significant increase in the official number of registered Turks in Kosovo. As a result, when Yugoslavia agreed to send over 240,000 people to Turkey who officially belonged to the Turkish minority, most of them were Albanians who were forced to identify as Turks.⁴⁶

After the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia deteriorated, all Albanians were seen as potential agents of Albania and state enemies. The Yugoslav secret police, UDB, started the gun hunting from the Albanians. Villages would be surrounded by police and security forces, and the homes of Albanians would be searched while Albanian men would be interrogated and even beaten. The UDB constituted 60% of Serbs, 30% of Montenegrins, and only 10% of Albanians. The Yugoslavian authorities and security institutions harshly repressed all Albanian nationalistic movements. During the 1960s, the Revolutionary Movement for the Unification of the Albanians gained support from Albanians in Kosovo. Most of the members of the organisation, including its leader Adem Demaçi, were imprisoned. Demaçi himself served almost 28 years in jail between his first arrest in 1958 and 1990. Demaçi's resistance and patriotic activity inspired many young Albanians to start their political activism, earning him the 'Nelson Mandela of the Balkans' title. Trials like these gained notoriety when political activists, who had gained the support of the population, were unfairly imprisoned and sentenced for many years. This was a reaction by the state, which was afraid of their potential to gain support and oppose the state. While trying to improve the tense situation towards the Albanians, Kosovo was recognised as a legal entity at the federal level. However, it was still an autonomous region within Serbia. Although there were some improvements in the lives of Albanians, they were still considered secondary citizens in Yugoslavia.⁴⁷

The death of Tito, the famous leader of the SFRY, in the 1980s, paved the way for the ambitions of the new leader, Slobodan Milosevic, who sought to consolidate his rule and remain in power through Serbian nationalism. The autonomous province of Kosovo was at the time one of the poorest and most underdeveloped regions in Yugoslavia, if not the most impoverished. The political situation in Kosovo was also very harsh, as the government had

⁴⁶ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Memorandum submitted...*, *op. cit.*

V. Cubrilovic, *op. cit.*

N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp 314 –333.

⁴⁷ N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp 314 –333.

T. Judah, *op. cit.*, pp. 76.

crushed all critics and opposition movements in Kosovo. The prisons were full of political activists, the majority of whom were ethnic Albanians.⁴⁸ The 1980s brought dramatic changes to the political scene in the SFRY. In 1981, an Albanian movement emerged in Kosovo demanding the status of a republic, freedom of speech, freedom for political prisoners and equality with the other citizens and republics of Yugoslavia. As these demonstrations took place throughout Kosovo, the police killed several demonstrators, many others were seriously injured, and hundreds were arrested.⁴⁹

While the ICTY indictment stated that Milosevic aimed to accomplish his idea of a "Greater Serbia", his actions were further understood in this context. As all entities within the SFRY had veto power over changes within the federation, the first step was to centralise Serbia by taking away the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In the face of strong opposition from the Albanian community, Milosevic went ahead with his plan. The Communist Party orchestrated the replacement of ethnic Albanians within its ranks with Albanians loyal to its cause, which was the starting point of the plan.⁵⁰ These changes triggered a national movement within the Albanian community, with thousands of students protesting and miners in Kosovo's biggest mines going on hunger strikes. These forms of protest were unsuccessful. The Serbian state declared a "state of emergency" in Kosovo and sent in more police troops. A large number of Albanian political activists were murdered, and others were persecuted for their political activities. With the help of Albanian loyalists within the Communist Party and by exerting pressure on other party members through the presence of military and intelligence officers in the Kosovo Provincial Assembly, they approved the constitutional amendments. These amendments gave the Serbian Republic sweeping powers over Kosovo, including internal affairs, defence, justice and several other areas.⁵¹

Rejecting direct Serbian rule, the Albanian community in Kosovo had developed its "underground" institutions, a parallel system by which the community was to live.⁵² Although

⁴⁸ M. Glenny, *op. cit.*, pp 623.

⁴⁹ Kosova Press, *42 vjet nga demonstratat e vitit 1981*, <https://kosovapress.com/%E2%80%8B42-vjet-nga-demonstratat-e-vitit-1981/> [accessed: 16.12.2023].

⁵⁰ N. Tromp, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-37.

⁵¹ S. Ukshini, *Demonstratat studentore të 30 dhe 31 majit 1989...*, <https://telegrafi.com/demonstratat-studentore-te-30-dhe-31-majit-1989/> [accessed: 14.12.2023].

N. Tromp, *op. cit.*, pp. 166.

⁵² Top Channel, *30 vjet nga Deklarata Kushtetuese e 2 Korrikut në Kosovë*, <https://top-channel.tv/2020/07/02/30-vjet-nga-deklarata-kushtetuese-e-2-korrikut-ne-kosove/> [accessed: 14.11.2023].

T. Mazowiecki, *op. cit.*

some "sham" elections were organised in 1992, the Albanian community boycotted them due to a lack of confidence in the system. The "underground" Albanian system organised its parallel elections, but in response, the regime arrested several political activists throughout Kosovo to stop these elections.⁵³ Regarding freedom of the media, the leading Albanian publishing house was taken over by a Serbian-run (government) publishing house, which dismissed all the Albanian staff. In public television and radio, Albanian staff were also rejected, and Albanian programming was limited to 15 minutes a day, presented by Serbian journalists who spoke Albanian.⁵⁴

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES DURING THE 90S

For many years, the Albanian community in Yugoslavia lived in constant fear for their lives, feeling threatened by the actions or inactions of the state towards them. Such situations can best be understood by looking back at some of the most famous human rights violations against the Albanians.

In March 1990, more than 7000 Albanian students were hospitalised with symptoms of poisoning. The hospitals, which ethnic Serbs controlled, often refused to provide medical care to these students. The situation seemed even more suspicious when the then government said Albanian separatists had orchestrated it. There were no proper laboratories in Kosovo then, so the samples for biochemical tests were to be sent to Croatia, England and France. However, it was later discovered that these samples never reached their destination because government institutions blocked them.⁵⁵

The Albanian community faced relentless aggression, manifesting in the form of forceful actions as well. Police forces frequently raided Albanian homes without a warrant and detained individuals solely based on their ethnicity, association with organisations or political activity. Many Albanians arrested during these raids died in prison as a result of ill-treatment and severe beatings. Nevertheless, the regime often justified its actions by claiming that it was carrying out operations to confiscate illegal firearms, that the Albanians were "oppressing" the Serb

Human Rights Watch, *Yugoslavia...*, *op. cit.*

⁵³ Ekonomia Online, *Historiku i zgjedhjeve në Kosovë*, <https://ekonomiaonline.com/historiku-zgjedhjeve-ne-kosove/> [accessed: 17.12.2023].

⁵⁴ T. Mazowiecki, *op. cit.*

⁵⁵ Telegrafi, *Helmimi i nxënësve në vitin 1990, krimi që nuk u dënua kurrë* (Video), <https://telegrafi.com/helmimi-i-nxenesve-ne-vitin-1990-krimi-qe-nuk-u-denua-kurre-video/> [accessed: 17.12.2023].

community in Kosovo and that they had "irredentist aspirations". However, according to the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Albanian resistance in Kosovo had always been peaceful.⁵⁶

Another human security issue for the Albanian community was the obligation to complete military service. Military service had always been compulsory for citizens of Yugoslavia. However, ethnic Albanians were always reluctant to serve there because Albanians who joined the obligatory military service frequently would not come back alive. Institutions would assess such cases as fatal accidents during training, suicide, or sometimes; they would not provide any explanation. However, these situations were not rare, making it difficult to believe they were a coincidence. When the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina started, the Serbian government began to mobilise the army and look for recruits in non-Serb communities. When Albanians refused to answer the call, the police raided their homes and took them away against their will.⁵⁷ The systematic discrimination, violence and repression imposed on the Albanian community in Yugoslavia not only created a constant fear for their lives but also undermined their human security.

In 1990, the international community responded to the human rights situation in Kosovo by sending delegations to assess the situation. One such delegation was led by Bob Dole from the US Congress. Additionally, the UN's Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, visited the capital city of Kosovo, Prishtina. Both delegations expressed their concerns about the human rights abuses occurring at that time in Kosovo. By 1993, the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now composed only of Serbia and Montenegro) had rejected several times the entry of international missions which aimed to monitor and investigate the human rights abuses in former Yugoslavia. The international community has been aware of the human rights violations. Hence, the government of Yugoslavia insisted on refusing the documentation of such abuses as they offered different justifications for each of the cases.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ T. Mazowiecki, *op. cit.*

⁵⁷ B. Baliu, *Ushtarët shqiptarë të vrarë në ushtrinë jugosllave (Emrat)*, <https://www.epokaere.com/ushtarët-shqiptarë-te-vrare-ne-ushtrine-jugosllave-emrat/> [accessed: 21.12.2023].

Human Rights Watch, *Yugoslavia...*, *op. cit.*

⁵⁸ Amnesty International, *Amnesty International News Service 78/93*, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/nws110781993en.pdf> [accessed: 17.12.2023].

An Amnesty International report in 1994 stated that the situation was continuing along the same lines, with police abuse of ethnic Albanians increasing. In addition, the government encouraged ethnic Albanians to emigrate and continued the colonisation of Kosovo to change the demographic balance. Such actions were considered to constitute "ethnic cleansing".⁵⁹ The situation kept worsening for years, which led to the Albanians finally deciding to respond to the oppression with force. By the end of 1997, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had been established. The KLA, a guerrilla group of poorly trained or untrained volunteers, fought against the Serbian forces with superior military capacities and preparedness. However, the KLA had a significant advantage during the war due to its support from the population and familiarity with the terrain. Despite this, the conflict quickly became extremely violent as Serbia launched a brutal campaign against civilians. The international missions in Kosovo documented war crimes committed by Serbian forces, such as the Abrija massacre, where several civilians, including women and children, were killed. Another widely publicised case was the Reçak massacre, where over 40 civilians, including women and children, were executed. However, when the head of the Kosovo Verification Mission had publicly accused the Serbian forces of this massacre, the Serbian authorities demanded his resignation and claimed that no civilian was killed and that those people shown in the images were KLA soldiers who had been masked as civilians. Additionally, Serbian forces coerced the civil Albanian population to leave Kosovo by trains and other means of transportation and led them towards Macedonia and Albania. According to a UNHCR report, more than 800,000 Albanians had left Kosovo by 1999. The international community believed it was necessary to intervene to halt the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians. In Rambouillet, France, the international community tried to reach a peace agreement between Serbia and the Albanian delegation, and it even warned Serbia that if the hostilities didn't stop, they would intervene by bombing it. However, Milosevic did not believe them and refused to sign the peace agreement. Therefore, for 90 days, starting from the 24th of May 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force, an aerial campaign targeting military targets. The campaign ended on the 10th of June 1999, when Serbia signed an agreement with NATO, which obliged Serb troops to leave Kosovo and put Kosovo under the protection of NATO peacekeeping troops.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Amnesty International, *Yugoslavia - Police violence against ethnic - Albanians in Kosovo province*, <https://www.amnesty.org/ar/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eur700061994en.pdf> [accessed: 18.12.2023].

⁶⁰ T. Judah, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-92.

Nevertheless, there have been instances where Serbian authorities have been accused of committing crimes against their people and falsely blaming Albanians for inciting further hatred towards them. One such instance was the 'Panda' coffee shop shooting in the city of Peja, where unidentified individuals opened fire inside the bar, resulting in the deaths of six young men of Serbian nationality. Many Albanians were wrongfully detained, tortured and coerced to admit guilt by the Serb authorities in this case, even though later they were released due to lack of evidence connecting them to the crime. To this day, they suffer the physical and psychological consequences of those tortures while the case remains unsolved. However, during a TV interview 2013, the current Serbian President, Alexander Vucic, claimed to know who was behind the crime. He stated that people would be shocked when the truth came out, as the Albanians had nothing to do with it. The parents of the murdered young Serbs are convinced that the Serbian secret service was behind the attack and have continuously sought answers from their president. The prosecution in Serbia has invited President Vucic for an interview as part of investigations into the continuing unresolved case.⁶¹

CULTURAL SECURITY AND CULTURAL AGGRESSION (CF. ANTHROPOLOGICAL AGGRESSION)

Apart from the political, social, and economic repression, Albanians also faced cultural repression under Serbian rule. Authorities often altered Albanian names by adding the suffix 'ic' or translating them into Serbian, contributing to the ongoing Serbianization of Albanian language and names. Furthermore, for many years, Albanians in Kosovo were denied the right to open schools in their native language. This was justified by the argument that there was no Albanian minority in Yugoslavia, only Albanianized Serbs.⁶²

Apart from the language, there are various monuments and buildings around Kosovo that were built by the Serbian state and are seen as symbols of Serbian oppression when Kosovo

NATO, *Kosovo Air Campaign...*, op. cit.

N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*

⁶¹ F. Rudic, S. Haxhiaja, *Kosovo's Panda Café Massacre Mystery Unsolved 20 Years On*, <https://balkaninsight.com/2018/12/14/kosovo-s-panda-cafe-massacre-mystery-unsolved-20-years-on-12-13-2018/> [accessed: 30.12.2023].

Koha, *The prosecution accepts the request to interrogate Vucic on the "Panda" case*, <https://www.koha.net/en/arboretum/390362/the-prosecution-accepts-the-request-to-interrogate-the-bull-for-the-panda-case/> [accessed: 30.12.2023].

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⁶² N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-333, 264-288.

Albanians were considered second-class citizens. Two of the most famous monuments in Kosovo that represent cultural aggression towards ethnic Albanians are presented below.

SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN PRISHTINA

As previously stated, the Serbian Orthodox Church has historically played a significant role in promoting Serbian nationalism. Serbian nationalism has also elevated the Serbian Orthodox Church as a critical component of Serbian identity. The Church of Savior Jesus Christ, a Serbian Orthodox Church located in Prishtina, was constructed in 1992 on the public University of Prishtina campus. Several investigations have shown that the financing for the construction of this church came from the political party of the Serbian war criminal Zeljko Raznatovic, also known as Arkan, a war criminal, infamous for his monstrous crimes in the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Arkan and his associates were at laying the church's foundation stones. The construction of this church is considered illegal as it was never formally approved. The church representatives claim to have received a legal document validating its construction in 1999, during the Kosovo War, seven years after it was built.⁶³ Nevertheless, the church can still be found on the university's main campus, remaining unused and unfinished. The Serbian Orthodox Church has occasionally used it to provoke situations, such as when they organised an unannounced liturgy, which was considered a violation of Kosovo's public security regulations. Furthermore, the church is still in a legal dispute with the University of Prishtina regarding its presence there. In addition to its legal issues, the population of Kosovo holds a negative sentiment towards this church because it was built during Milosevic's rule and was financed by Arkan, two responsible figures for the mass crimes committed against the Albanians during the last war.⁶⁴

THE GAZIMESTAN MONUMENT

⁶³ Telegrafi, Partia e kriminelit Arkan financues i Kishës Serbe në hapësirat e UP-së”, <https://telegrafi.com/partia-e-kriminelit-arkan-financues-kishes-serbe-ne-hapesirat-e-se/> [accessed: 10.01.2024].

⁶⁴ Telegrafi, *Beteja juridike mes Kishës Serbe dhe Universitetit të Prishtinës për tokën në kampusin universitar*, <https://telegrafi.com/beteja-juridike-mes-kishes-serbe-dhe-universitetit-te-prishtines-per-token-ne-kampusin-universitar/> [accessed: 10.01.2024].

P. Isufi, M. Stojanovic, *Liturgy at contested Serbian church prompts protests in Prishtina*, <https://prishtinainsight.com/liturgy-at-contested-serbian-church-prompts-protests-in-prishtina/> [accessed: 30.12.2023].

Built-in 1953 near Prishtina, the Gazimestan Monument was made to Commemorate the Battle of Kosovo of 1389', a battle between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan nations. This battle and its myth have been used for many years by Serbian nationalist and Orthodox propaganda to present Kosovo as 'the sacred Serbian land'. Even though the Balkan forces, which included Albanians among many other nations, lost against the Ottoman Empire in this battle, this date is celebrated as a victory day by the Serbs. Saint Vidi Day, or Vidovdan as the Serbs call it, is the day when Serbs from different regions of Serbia gather in this place in Kosovo to celebrate it while promoting nationalist and chauvinism symbols. It was also at this exact location where Slobodan Milosevic held his famous speech, which was often considered the beginning of Yugoslavia's fall. Therefore, the celebrations in this place, conducted by the Serbs, are regarded as provocations and have continuously incited tensions and hate. The aim of these celebrations has very little to do with the celebrations of the historical event, for which, naturally, there is nothing to celebrate since the battle has already been lost. However, the primary purpose of these celebrations is to reshape the region's narrative and consequently rewrite the historical facts to support their claims over Kosovo.⁶⁵

CONCLUSION

In summary, Serbian nationalism has been guided by various individuals and institutions over the years, with several documents serving as manifestos for its ideals. Despite the diversity in leadership and doctrinal foundations, a common objective was clear: pursuing Serbian pre-eminence within the region vis-à-vis other nations. Furthermore, the overarching goal has consistently involved positioning Serbia as the guardian of all Slavs in the Balkans and asserting a monopoly on the adherence to the Orthodox Religion. Furthermore, in most cases, the tools promoted to attain these goals encompassed the use of anthropological and cultural knowledge of the other nations. This approach aimed to formulate their policies tailored to exert influence on these ethnic groups to further the overarching goals of Serbian nationalism.

⁶⁵ G. Wollentz, *Conflicted memorials and the need to look forward. The interplay between remembering and forgetting in Mostar and on the Kosovo Field*, pp. 159-182, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337931418_Conflicted_Memorials_and_the_Need_to_Look_Forward_The_Interplay_Between_Remembering_and_Forgetting_in_Mostar_and_on_the_Kosovo_Field#fullTextFileContent [accessed: 30.12.2023].
Express, *Buxhovi thotë se monumenti i Gazemistanit është dashur të rrëzohet kur u ngrit shteti i Kosovës*, <https://www.gazetaexpress.com/buxhovi-thote-se-monumenti-i-gazemistanit-eshte-dashur-te-rrezohet-kur-u-ngrit-shteti-i-kosoves/> [accessed: 30.12.2023].

It is crucial to note that while Serbian nationalism was perceived as a threat to most of the ethnic groups of the region, its most severe impact has been proven in its treatment of the Albanians. This can be attributed to the perception that the Albanians lacked any commonality with the Serbs regarding ethnic identity.

The driving figures, institutions, and associated documents that have significantly shaped the narrative of Serbian nationalism, resulting in the oppression of various ethnic groups and, notably, the Albanians, include Ilija Garasanin and his document 'The Draft Plan' (Nacertanije), Vaso Cubrilovic and his persistent efforts in advocating for the oppression and expulsion of the Albanians, exemplified by the document titled 'The Expulsion of Albanians.' Additionally, the influence of Dobrica Cosic and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, notably demonstrated through their 1986 Memorandum, have played integral roles. Moreover, the Serbian Orthodox Church has actively promoted Serbian nationalism, mainly through its clergy in various regions, with a notable emphasis on Kosovo. Lastly, Slobodan Milosevic's tenure marked a ruthless campaign against Kosovo Albanians, involving the revocation of their autonomy and the initiation of a brutal war aimed at ethnically cleansing the Kosovo Albanian population.

In conclusion, the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo endured prolonged periods of human rights violations within Yugoslavia. Those residing in the former Yugoslavia were deprived of the fundamental conditions essential for a dignified existence, marked by persistent threats and economic hardships. The unyielding actions of the Serbian regime to centralise power and suppress Kosovo's autonomy have resulted in severe human security challenges for the ethnic Albanian community. The series of human rights abuses against the Albanian population, including political persecution, violence against demonstrators, constraints on media freedom and freedom of speech, and the dismantling of Albanian institutions, have heightened tensions, jeopardising the well-being and rights of the Albanian community in Kosovo.

Therefore, taking into consideration all the above presented information, the approach of the Serbian nationalism, later translated into actual policy of Serbia, towards the Albanians checks almost all of the boxes of the ten stages of the anthropological aggression.

The Albanian population's response to the anthropological aggression has been significant, with its resistance culminating in the 1998/1999 war of the KLA. It can be concluded that this represents an example of anthropological defence.

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