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## ANTI-ACCESS/AREA-DENIAL OPERATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN LIGHT OF AN ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

### ANTYDOSTĘPOWA DZIAŁALNOŚĆ FEDERACJI ROSYJSKIEJ Z PERSPEKTYWY ART. 5 KONSTYTUCJI RP



**ABSTRACT:** The subject of the article is an interdisciplinary (especially in the field of legal and security sciences) discussion of the anti-access/area denial operation of the Russian Federation, both in its international aspect, but also from the point of view of national security and legal systems aimed at protecting independence and inviolability of the territory of states (see Article 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland). This is an original approach and can be a valuable benchmark for practice. One of the main goals of the study is to indicate that the security of the European state now depends not only on the identification and counteracting classical threats (e.g. war), but also on maintaining the constitutional structure of institutions, which determines the proper functioning of the state. The main determinant of the ability to perform Polish anti-access/area denial operations is the achieved state of combat readiness and the financing of the security system – taking into account all the elements specified in Art. 5 of the CRP. Maintaining constitutional values depends primarily on the indicated system solutions, resulting in, inter alia, the ability to maintain the continuity of the state and its individual elements. Hence, among others the thesis that the expected abilities of individual components securing constitutional values are mutually dependent, especially since in a specific operation each of the components may receive a main, supporting, securing or auxiliary task.

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**KEYWORDS:** Constitution, Russian Federation, independence, national security

**ABSTRAKT:** Przedmiotem artykułu jest interdyscyplinarne (zwłaszcza na gruncie nauk prawnych i nauk o bezpieczeństwie) omówienie antydostępowej działalności Federacji Rosyjskiej, zarówno w jej aspekcie międzynarodowym, ale też z punktu widzenia krajowych systemów bezpieczeństwa i prawnych, ukierunkowanych na ochronę niepodległości i nienaruszalności terytorium państw (zob. art. 5 Konstytucji RP). Jest to podejście oryginalne i może stanowić wartościowy punkt odniesienia dla praktyki. Jednym z głównych celów opracowania jest wskazanie, że obecnie bezpieczeństwo państwa europejskiego zależy nie tylko od identyfikacji i przeciwdziałania zagrożeniom klasycznym (np. wojnie), lecz od zachowania konstytucyjnego układu instytucji, decydującego o prawidłowym funkcjonowaniu państwa. Zasadniczym wyznacznikiem zdolności do polskich działań antydostępowych jest osiągnięty stan gotowości bojowej oraz finansowanie systemu bezpieczeństwa – przy uwzględnieniu wszystkich elementów określonych w art. 5 KRP. Utrzymanie konstytucyjnych wartości zależy przede wszystkim od wskazanych rozwiązań systemowych, skutkujących m.in. zdolnością do utrzymania ciągłości działania państwa i poszczególnych jego elementów. Stąd postawiono m.in. tezę, że oczekiwane zdolności poszczególnych komponentów zabezpieczających wartości konstytucyjne wzajemnie się warunkują, zwłaszcza że w konkretnej operacji każdy z komponentów może otrzymać główne, wspierające, zabezpieczające lub pomocnicze zadanie.

**SŁOWA KLUCZOWE:** Konstytucja, Federacja Rosyjska, niepodległość, bezpieczeństwo państwa

## INTRODUCTION

Non-state actors have currently become more actively involved in actions related to the safety environment. Their intentions and capabilities are often unknown, which contributes to certain chaos and causes uncertainty in the international community, but also domestically (internal safety systems) in light of an Article 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland<sup>1</sup>, pursuant to which the Republic of Poland guards the independence and integrity of its territory<sup>2</sup>. The creators of the constitutional regulations juxtaposed the provisions of Article 5 with the principle of national sovereignty<sup>3</sup> expressed in Article 4, nevertheless, the obligations

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<sup>1</sup> *Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997* ("Journal of Laws" No. 78, item 483, as amended), hereinafter CRP.

<sup>2</sup> See: Tuleja P., *Artykuł 5* [in:] P. Czarny, M. Florczak-Wątor, B. Naleziński, P. Radziewicz, P. Tuleja, *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz*, LEX/el. 2021. See also: Walczuk K., *Suwerenność państwa jako element krajowego bezpieczeństwa publicznego*, [in:] *System Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP. Stan prawny, zakres przedmiotowy, podmiotowy oraz funkcjonalny prawa bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP*, ed. M. Karpiuk, Warszawa 2013, pp. 313-318.

<sup>3</sup> See: Walczuk K., *The constitutional principle of the sovereignty of Nation and State in contrast to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice – an outline of relation on the example of Poland*, [in:] *Medzinárodný súdny*

arising from Article 5 are imposed mainly on Polish public authorities or bodies authorized by them<sup>4</sup>.

The abovementioned features can be regarded as defining if we refer to the current security policy. The influence of events and actions in one part of the world on the security of other distant locations is extremely difficult to gauge. This is why both the over- and underestimation of hazards are equally likely. Currently, the state of the security environment forces the global community to counteract global hazards that apply to individual states by involving international organisations, such as NATO, the UN and the EU, in order to solve crises worldwide. Gradually, more states send their contingencies to support the operation of international coalitions in crisis response situations. That is why it has become so essential to determine the hazards that impact the effectiveness of the measures taken, including, but not limited to, those required for the implementation of the items set out in Article 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, also assuming that they have a "programmatic character"<sup>5</sup>.

In this context, we will determine the semantic scope of the term "state security", which is crucial from a constitutional point of view.<sup>6</sup> The aspect which enables the effective functioning of a state organisation and, essentially, determines its maintenance as a structure is of great significance.<sup>7</sup> A protected state, including but not limited to protecting its independence and territory integrity, is an institutional and territorial "space" in which individuals and groups can

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*dvor: slovenská a česká teória a prax. Zborník príspevkov z V. slovensko-českého medzinárodnoprávneho sympózia. Kúpele Nimnica 28.-29. septembra 2012, Bratislava 2012, pp. 73-79*

<sup>4</sup> See: Tuleja P., *op. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> See: Tuleja P., *op. cit.*; Sarnecki P., *Artykuł 5 [in:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Tom I*, ed. L. Garlicki, M. Zubik, Warszawa 2016, LEX/el. See also: Gizbert-Studnicki T., Grabowski A., *Normy programowe w Konstytucji [in:] Charakter i struktura norm Konstytucji*, ed. J. Trzeciński, Warszawa 1997, pp. 99-102.

<sup>6</sup> See: Czuryk M., *Bezpieczeństwo jako dobro wspólne*, "Zeszyty Naukowe KUL" 2018, no. 3, p. 15; Karpiuk M., *Organisation of the National System of Cybersecurity: Selected Issues*, "Studia Iuridica Lublinensia" 2021, vol. 30(2), p. 234; Karpiuk M., *The Provision of Safety in Water Areas: Legal Issues*, "Studia Iuridica Lublinensia" 2022, vol. 31(1), pp. 81-82; Kostrubiec J., *The Role of Public Order Regulations as Acts of Local Law in the Performance of Tasks in the Field of Public Security by Local Self-government in Poland*, "Lex localis – Journal of Local Self-Government" 2021, vol. 19(1), p. 115; Jaraczewski J., *Bezpieczeństwo państwa jako wartość chroniona w Konstytucji RP*, [in:] *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w pierwszych dekadach XXI wieku wobec wyzwań politycznych, gospodarczych, technologicznych i społecznych*, ed. S. Biernat, Warsaw 2013, pp. 63–65; Wołpiuk W.J., *Bezpieczeństwo państwa i pojęcia pokrewne. Aspekty konstytucyjnoprawne*, [in:] "Krytyka prawa. Niezależne studia nad prawem" 2010, vol. 2(1), pp. 181–202; Bień-Kacała A., *Bezpieczeństwo w Konstytucji RP z 1997 r. – wstępna diagnoza*, "Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego" 2015, vol. 24(2), pp. 12–27.

<sup>7</sup> See: Walczuk K., Bożek M., *Konstytucyjne i ustawowe uwarunkowania organizacji i funkcjonowania Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, Siedlce 2015, pp. 44–45.

pursue their individual goals (satisfy their needs).<sup>8</sup> This means that there are two reasons which justify the protection of the state, mentioned in Article 5 of the CRP. The first applies to the systemic dimension, where the state is equated with the state authorities that perform public tasks, while the second has an individual dimension, where the state becomes the prerequisite for the maintenance of individuals (their lives, freedom and property) and social life.<sup>9</sup>

State security approached this way perceives the regular operation of the state as a condition of its internal stability and sovereignty. In this sense, the execution of the protective function is nothing other than taking measures to ensure state security; strictly speaking, it concerns all aspects,<sup>10</sup> which in normative acts, are referred to as “citizens' security”, “internal security”, “external security”, “public order” and “constitutional order”. Taken together, all measures are supposed to lead to a situation in which all hazards that undermine the protected values are recognised and eliminated.<sup>11</sup> Thus, ensuring the state organisation safety is a process of reality “becoming” free of hazards. The process greatly depends on the effective forecasting, recognition and elimination of hazards in the area of international and internal relations, as well as on security and protective initiatives (in a broad sense). It is aimed to establish favourable conditions of state functioning internationally and internally.<sup>12</sup>

## **RUSSIA'S A2/AD OPERATIONS**

Based on an in-depth analysis of the current international security environment, it will be stated that the Russian Federation follows a strategy of using military measures within A2/AD.<sup>13</sup> The concept is based on assuming that a real opponent can be prevented from entering the theatre of operations (Anti-Access) due to the use of long-range weapons, and is deprived of

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<sup>8</sup> See: Walczuk K., Bożek M., *op. cit.*, pp. 45–46. See also: some aspects in Potrzyszcz J., *Bezpieczeństwo prawne z perspektywy filozofii prawa*, Lublin 2013, pp. 69–87; Wołpiuk W., *Bezpieczeństwo państwa a prawo do wolności i bezpieczeństwa osobistego*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo państwa a ochrona praw i wolności jednostki we współczesnym świecie*, ed. J. Jaskiernia, Kielce 2012, p. 88.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* See also: Lamentowicz W., *Państwo współczesne*, Warsaw 1997, p. 10; Banaszak B., *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz*, Warszawa 2009, p. 177; Walczuk K., *Bezpieczeństwo publiczne – próba definicji*, [in:] *Prawo bezpieczeństwa publicznego*, eds. M. Karpiuk, K. Walczuk, Warsaw 2013, pp. 17–20.

<sup>10</sup> Sarnecki P., *Artykuł 5*, [in:] *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz*, vol. V, ed. L. Garlicki, Warsaw 2007.

<sup>11</sup> See: Walczuk K., Bożek M., *op. cit.*, pp. 46–47. See also: S. Dworecki, *Zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa państwa*, Warsaw 1994, p. 16.

<sup>12</sup> See: Walczuk K., Bożek M., *op. cit.*, pp. 46–47; Kitler W., *System bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Warsaw 2004, p. 48.

<sup>13</sup> A2/AD – Anti-Access, Area-Denial

the possibility to operate freely in the theatre of operations (Area Denial) by short-range weapons. Russia proposes to use surface-to-air missiles,<sup>14</sup> anti-ship ballistic missiles,<sup>15</sup> anti-ship cruise missiles<sup>16</sup> and mines or drones to execute A2/AD tasks. Such measures are asymmetrical and tend to be employed by potentially weaker countries that use their advantage resulting from an operation near their territory.<sup>17</sup> This concept is right and offers Russia the freedom to run its foreign policy and take care of its national interests in reference to the hazards included in the new *War Doctrine*<sup>18</sup> (which includes many repetitions taken from the 2010 doctrine but also defines the reality of that time, introducing new terms related to safety, specifying new internal and external hazards and addressing the issues of allies).

It is common knowledge that Russia aspires to becoming a global empire. Russia assigns fundamental importance in its national interests in the global arena, which is characterised by contacts with countries that remain within Russia's areas of interest despite being geographically distant. This is meant to strengthen Russia's position in solving global problems. The active building of an approach to international relations that would ensure Russia's most important position, corresponding to its political ambitions and supported by the military potential in this system, is the country's critical national interest in this respect.<sup>19</sup> Nonetheless, Poland, as Russia's neighbour, remains in its area of interest so the regulation of Article 5 of the CRP shall also apply in this context.

In accordance with such a concept of the Russian Federation's A2/AD operations, Poland and NATO started to increase the military potential to counteract Russian capabilities within the A2/AD concept. As such, NATO is demonstrating its presence at the eastern flank,<sup>20</sup> mainly because Russia is evidently improving its capabilities of blocking the potential assistance of the allied forces in Poland or the Baltic States in the case of aggression. Owing to the American initiative to strengthen the region, the quantitative potential of the troops staying at the eastern

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<sup>14</sup> SAM – Surface to Air Missile

<sup>15</sup> ASBM – Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile

<sup>16</sup> ASCM – Anti-Ship Cruise Missile

<sup>17</sup> See: T. Smura, Rosyjskie zdolności w zakresie środków izolowania pola walki (A2AD) – wnioski dla NATO, Pułaski Policy Papers. *Komentarz Międzynarodowy Pułaskiego*, 27 November 2016, pp. 1–2. See also: <https://pulaski.pl/rosyjskie-zdolnosci-w-zakresie-srodkow-izolowania-pola-walki-a2ad-wnioski-dla-nato/> [access: 20.10.2020].

<sup>18</sup> Signed by President Vladimir Putin on 26 December 2014. See: *Doktryna wojenna Federacji Rosyjskiej* (draft translation), “Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe” III/2015, pp. 179–206.

<sup>19</sup> Żyła M., *Obwód Kaliningradzki w polityce bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej*, Warsaw 2018, p. 6.

<sup>20</sup> eFP – NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence.

flank has increased in real terms. Moreover, in order to implement the items of Article 5 of the CRP, while building our A2/AD capabilities at the border (with Russia and Belarus, especially considering the events after the presidential election in Belarus in 2020), we should focus on increasing the number of coastal naval missile units, strengthening the potential of unmanned reconnaissance and strike platforms, as well as the anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence, improving the radio-electronic warfare capabilities, intensifying works on modern mine warfare methods and purchasing new submarines that will materialise the land and sea border anti-access concept.

Poland and the North Atlantic Treaty members have to develop a convergent strategy and invest in armament measures and systems that can break the Russian Federation's A2/AD systems, also called "standoff weapons".<sup>21</sup> Implementing small and relatively cheap unmanned aircraft that can pass as MALD<sup>22</sup> (Miniature Air-Launched Decoys) seems to be the right solution; this way, they can mislead and defuse anti-aircraft missile systems. The need to develop operational capabilities in defusing battlefield isolation measures in the NATO – NDPP<sup>23</sup> defence planning will be considered. ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) is a priority for NATO states because adequate tools in this area will help identify the enemy's measures.<sup>24</sup>

The concept of A2/AD operations presented above, Russia's strategic interests and their defining method, pose a real hazard for Poland and the Baltic States. Russia is ready to use any form of hybrid operations,<sup>25</sup> political pressure and propaganda to interfere in these countries' home affairs. At present, a European state's security depends on maintaining a specific institutional system that determines the correct functioning of the state as a political organisation rather than on the identification and counteracting of classical hazards, such as

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<sup>21</sup> Standoff weapon – manoeuvring missiles on airborne or marine platforms, supported by an effective real-time target localisation system.

<sup>22</sup> MALD – Miniature Air-Launched Decoy.

<sup>23</sup> NDPP – NATO Defence Planning Process. See more: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49202.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm) [access: 20.10.2020].

<sup>24</sup> See Smura T., *op. cit.*, pp. 7–8.

<sup>25</sup> Russia can use hybrid war methods towards the Baltic States. These are defined as combinations of different military and non-military measures. The Russian Federation often uses media disinformation, including but not limited to social media. Fake news about the rape of Estonian women by NATO soldiers or the "loss" of a weapon of mass destruction in Latvia make good examples of such disinformation.

war.<sup>26</sup> It can be suspected that the central assumption of Russia's policy towards the Baltic States that are Poland's allies, especially in light of Article 5 of the CRP, is to disintegrate NATO and EU's political and military integrity. The Russian Federation attempts to regain political and economic dominance over its neighbours, mainly those representing the old block from the Cold War. Furthermore, with these measures, Russia aims at maintaining its military advantage in the Baltic region and preventing Finland and Sweden from joining NATO. The critical argument Russia can use to pursue its national interest is the defence of the Russian-speaking community's rights<sup>27</sup> (for example, the hybrid operations in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and the fact that Russians constitute about 25% of the Estonian and Latvian populations).

It can be presumed that the positioning of the NATO military forces at the NATO eastern flank threatens Russia effectively, jeopardises Russian provocations in the region and is of paramount importance for maintaining the integrity of Poland's borders. Still, in order to ensure effective resistance to Russian hazards, regular analyses of the security status need to be carried out, monitoring and early warning implemented, and the civil services of the Baltic States strengthened and trained, as they are the first to respond to any evidence of hybrid operations before NATO intervenes. Strengthening cyberspace security, protecting critical infrastructure, disinformation countermeasures, and cooperation between civil and military forces are indispensable.<sup>28</sup>

## **NON-NORMATIVE THREATS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF CRP**

Based on the current security environment, international determinants and different geopolitical factors, several types of threats to Poland's independence and territorial integrity can be enumerated. They include Poland's transit location, which fosters various pathologies in the security area, such as organised international crime, human trafficking, smuggling of

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<sup>26</sup> Bożek M., *Instytucjonalny system bezpieczeństwa państwa w świetle Konstytucji RP na tle członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej*, [in]: Europa – kontynent ryzyka? Społeczne, polityczne i normatywne uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa w Europie, eds. M. Bożek, M. Troszyński, Warsaw 2007, pp. 101–102.

<sup>27</sup> The imperial policy of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet area involves the demonstration of ensuring the security and self-defence of its citizens. The survival of the state and the empire are the base of the superpower's status. 'Nowadays Russia longs for what superpowers have always longed for: to maintain the dominant position in the strategically important regions and to eliminate the influences of other superpowers thereof' – based on R. Kagan, *Powrót historii i koniec marzeń*, Poznań 2009, p. 25.

<sup>28</sup> See more: Piotrowski M.A., Raś K., *Wzrost zagrożenia rosyjskiego w raportach bałtyckich służb specjalnych*, "Biuletyn PISM", No. 44(1394), 15 July 2016.

weapons and hazardous materials and drug trafficking. The operation of secret services (security intelligence), which can gain access to confidential information, including, but not limited to, information crucial for the cooperation of the alliance, is among the currently identified hazard factors that must not be neglected. The activity of terrorist, extremist and organised criminal groups is also significant in this respect. Last but not least, ICT hazards have negative security implications.

Military hazards are nowadays the most vital for the functioning of the A2/AD system. They are closely related to non-military hazards, whose symptoms are the first evidence of the opponent's operation. The essential objective of the opponent's activity is to destabilise the state's internal security system. These days, this can involve instigating and orienting migration to the country's territory and then intentionally creating a hazard. The hazard can be accompanied by subversive actions intended to look like terrorist attacks, which strongly impact society. There is a high likelihood that what might be commonly regarded as a weapon of mass destruction may be used during such operations. Secret services can be used for the attacks in order to continue offensive information warfare. In such a situation, the psychological impact on society must not be neglected, as it is aimed at discrediting the current and future authorities and undermining the historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions of defending one's home country. Disinformation activities can also turn into an attempt to distort a country's image as being unfriendly to foreigners, and where the rules of democracy are violated.

The disorganisation of the state authority functioning can be carried out on a large scale to expose the weakness of the Polish state. The employed measures might include cyberspace attacks on critical infrastructure components with a simultaneous disturbance of defence tasks by network operations in the electromagnetic spectrum. Such measures are intended to disturb telecommunication networks and deprive them of their usability.

The opponent can also use a cohesive set of military measures and operations described as radio-electronic warfare, which is the engineering base and an intrinsic part of information warfare. This can be carried out to reduce the effectiveness of command and control and the use of combat assets while ensuring command efficiency and weapons utilisation by their military. Actions aimed at achieving the established goals are carried out as part of the command and control systems and as a means to control the combat assets, and communication and reconnaissance measures by modifying the quality of the circulating

information, as well as the speed, parameters and features of the information processes. Protecting one's own systems against similar hazards from the opponent can be meaningful. It should involve communication and reconnaissance control, and protection of the information about new types of weapons, military equipment, military facilities and operations against foreign countries' engineering reconnaissance measures.

The influence exerted on society through the intensification of internal unrest, e.g. demonstrations revealing the potentiation of using military force and the simultaneous creation of excuses for aggression by attacking diplomatic posts, citizens of other countries or businesses with a foreign capital share, will bear great significance for the opponent. In such a case, the military force's demonisation can be expected, which may involve bringing the military infrastructure closer to the state borders and the development of offensive capabilities or redeployment of forces under the guise of military exercises. At the same time, the opponent may strive to compare the opposing parties' military potential in the media. A revisionist narrative on border stability, and actions meant to inspire, develop and support separatist movements vis-à-vis territorial claims are simultaneously put forth and can be expected.

Unmarked forces, labelled as self-defence units, can be used to fulfil these intentions. They will strive to block the military potential in areas of regular dislocation and selected military facilities. Using a contingent with no state affiliation can become a premise for introducing regular forces under the guise of supporting a neighbouring country's internal security. Dispatching the regular army can be expected as a final resort, which can be treated as evidence of the aggressor's determination to extend their influence zone.

The measures taken in such situations are often accompanied by media clutter or, in other words, an excess of contradicting or mutually exclusive information. This is meant to disturb the decision-makers' perception due to non-decisive, incompetent and lacking knowledge. Such information measures may cause conflicts between political and military leaders and their advocates and society. Consequently, their position will be naturally weakened and pressure will be exerted on the decision-makers. The opponent may also aim to compromise and undermine the authority of the most important persons in the region (voivodeship, district, commune).

In the current conditions, warfare will most probably mean contactless operations, unmanned vehicle/aircraft strikes, and precise munition attacks from beyond the observation

range and the opponent's counteracting capabilities. Essential tactical operations will include supervision, positioning and indication of targets. Direct contact combat will be limited to ambushes, attacks and area or facility searching. Therefore, this requires the armed forces to have strike and electronic destruction potential and reconnaissance, which involves the necessary and confirmed data and information.

In response to a new phenomenon, known as hybrid war, the army is prepared for non-conventional operations below the threshold of war, propaganda, information and psychological measures, and exerting economic and social pressure. It must be emphasised that the opponent will use any society antagonising methods, reach for legal measures, weaken the trust to governmental and local authorities, and undermine the credibility of public institutions. All these measures are meant to influence the leaders' will and operations and change society's attitude to their own country. Society should be aware that hybrid conflicts have already become our reality, and we should learn how to deal with the situation and make strategic decisions.

The issue of the mass immigration of refugees and people from conflict-affected regions should also be considered. It can contribute to a partial loss of control over the state's borders and disorganisation of the internal security system, as well as a partial breakdown of the economic system. Concerning the increasing hazard, troops will be sent to the problematic region to support civilian operations.

Hybrid hazards represent another type of hazard. The term "hybrid" in reference to security affairs can be explained as a combination of different methods to affect the opponent, from "soft" ones such as information warfare, cyberspace operations and psychological operations, through to "hard" ones, which include conventional military operations.<sup>29</sup> J.J. McCuen describes hybrid war as a combination of symmetrical and asymmetrical war.<sup>30</sup> A combination of three risk sources and unpredictable events, i.e. irregular (guerrilla) operations, classic conflicts and asymmetric hazards, can be the case.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Based on an interview with S. Koziej: *Bezpieczeństwa Polski w kontekście walki informacyjnej, związanej z wydarzeniami na Ukrainie*, Racja Stanu current affairs programme – TVP Polonia, broadcast on 23 February 2015, <http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/wypowiedzi-szefa-biura/6463,Szef-BBN-dla-TVP-Polonia-trzeba-wykorzystac-zainteresowanie-spoloczenstwa-sprawa.html?search=68766446> [access: 10.05.2015].

<sup>30</sup> McCuen J.J., *Hybrid Wars*, "MilitaryReview" 2008, No. 2, p. 108.

<sup>31</sup> Gruszczak A., *op.cit.*, p. 13.

## SUMMARY

Summing up the deliberations on the obligation to guard the independence and integrity of the territory of the Republic of Poland, set out in Article 5 of the CRP, one must note that considering the unfavourable geopolitical location and history of Poland, it seems valid to take care of the country's security and A2/AD system independently. The issue appears even more vital in light of the presented A2/AD operations of the Russian Federation. The achieved combat readiness and security system financing are the essential indicators of the Polish A2/AD operational capability, especially when all the elements mentioned in Article 5 of the CRP are considered.

The maintenance of the constitutional values provided for in Article 5 of the CRP, including but not limited to the independence and integrity of the Republic of Poland's territory, mainly depends on systemic solutions that apply to the mobilisation and operational development of the armed forces, their organisational condition, the amount and quality of the staff reserves, the possibility to use the matériel and engineering equipment, the ability to respond flexibly to any disturbance in the process of reaching higher readiness levels, as well as the financial means allocated for defence. The ability to maintain operational continuity helps create the conditions for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland to achieve their operational goals. This ability requires maintaining the adequate capacity of armament and equipment, the timely replenishment of reserves, combat assets and matériel in and outside the country's territory, loss recovery and staff rotation. Successful operational capability enables the effective use of one's own military potential and utilisation of means with the adequate range and striking accuracy. This goal can be reached through modern command systems, effective reconnaissance and intelligence, the availability of the required forces, planning procedures and commanding, the optimum use of combat assets, the preservation of stocks and combat assets, and military training.

Reconnaissance capability cannot be achieved without command capability, mobility, operation continuity, survival etc. Hence, it can be assumed that the expected capabilities of the operational components determine one another. They form a system of mutually supporting capabilities and are the determinants of future operations. Abandoning any of them

may result in losing operational effectiveness. Specific operational capabilities are indicators of the combat capabilities of each operation component. It should be remembered that a main, supporting, securing or auxiliary task can be assigned to every component in every operation. That is why each operation's real goals are the determinants of the components' actual combat capabilities.

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
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